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CASE NO. 10278 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J\HCHAEL MONTGOMERY, 
MARIE MONTGOMERY, 
LINDA MONTGOMERY, 
hy their guardian ad litem 
MARIE DA VIS, and 
BERNICE WOOD PODROZA, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs. -
PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the questions : 
1. As to whether or not an insured cooperated with 
an auto liability insurer, the appellant. 
2. Whether or not appellant was substantially prej-
udiced by insured's non-appearance at the trial. 
3. Whether appellant made any attempt to obviate 
prejudicial effect of the non-attendance of the insured. 
-!. Whether or not the appellant used due diligence 
to obtain the cooperation of the insured. 
5. Whether or not appcllant waived any lack of co-
operation by the insured. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWI~R COURT 
The case here on appeal is the result of a pr(·viou' 
case in the same district wherein the plaintiffs in l111· 
instant case obtained a judgment against the driver of 
an automobile which at the time of tlw accid('nt \1as 
insured by the appellant. Thrn•after tlw plaintiff:-
(respondents) brought direct action on their judgment 
against the insurer resulting in a judgnwnt against th" 
insurer (appellant). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's jndg-
ment. Respondents urge confirmation of the trial co mt':; 
decree. 
STATEi\lENT OF FACTS 
Darrell \Vood borrowed the car of his father, who 
had a policy with the Appellant, to take Lois ).Jontgo1u-
ery, tlw mother of the minor Montgomery plai11tiffr. 
Bernice \Voods Podroza, and Lawrence 1krrick for a 
drive. With Darrell \Yood at the wheel, the car left tlw 
hig}nrny resulting in fatal injuries to Lois Montgo1uery 
and injuries to Bernice \Voods Podraza. 
The minor children and Bernice \Voods Poclrmm filccl 
an action in Davis County, Ftah, against Danell Wood 
for their loss, which case was given file No. G9::lfi. Sum-
mons and Complaint were served upon Darrell Wood on 
February 28, 1958, but not deliven•cl to Appellant until 
April 12, 1958, (T. 77 L. 23 and I~xhibit 9). 
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The following dates are significant in this case: 
June :2G, 1957 Car ldt highway, resulting in death 
of Lois Montgomery and injuries to 
Bernice \Voods Podroza 
October 15, 1957 Darrell \Vood and passenger Lawr-
ence l\Ierrick gave statement to 
Appellant's representative before 
court reporter, Cecil Tucker, con-
cr•rning the circumstances of the 
day of June 26, 1957. 
November 13, 1958 Deposition of Darrell Wood taken 
before Court Reporter, Cecil Tuck-
er, in case No. 6936. 
December 18, 1958 Completed deposition of Darrell 
Wood mailed to address of named 
insured Willard Wood 
November, 19GO First effort by Appellant after De-
cember 18, 1958, to follow-up get-
ting the deposition signed. 
March 20, 1961 First letter to Darrell Wood re-
questing his signature on the depo-
sition after it was mailed to his 
father, December 18, 1958. 
August 1, 1961 Pre-trial of Case No. 6936 
September 12, 19Gl Trial day of Case No. 6936. 
Darrell Wood, on October 15, 1957, gave a statement 
to appellant's representative before Cecil Tucker, Court 
Ileportc•r (Exhibit 15). In this statement Darrell Wood 
stated that he was a carpenter, was then unemployed and 
had !wen since February, 1957, except for two weeks' 
work (page 2); that he was a married man, (page 1); 
that thPy bought a six pack of beer, (page 9) and bought 
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one other drink (page 12); that he and Lawrence Menick 
planned to tell and did tell the investigating officm 
that Lawrence Merrick was the driver at the tinw of th1' 
accident (pages 21 and 22); that he was sentPnccd tn 
six months in jail (page 22); serwd sixty-four day.1 
(page 23); that he had his driver's license revoked on 
a drunken driving charge about two years before (pnges 
24 and 25). 
The difficulty of finding Darrell Wood for deposi-
tion is described at T. 70-71. On November 13, 195S, 
Darrell Wood appeared for deposition with Appellant's 
counsel. The deposition followed generally the statement 
previously given except that in the deposition Darrr,11 
Wood said that no beer was purchased (page 11) which 
differed from the purchase of beer indicated in the state-
ment (page 9). The deposition also establisli(!d that he 
was in Michigan from March until June in 195G, the year 
before the accident. 
The completed deposition of Darrell Wood was 
mailed to ·willard Wood, father of Darrell Wood, Decew-
ber 18, 1958, requesting that he deliver it to Danell. 
There is no evidence that the deposition was ever de-
livered to Darrell Wood. 
There was no follow-up effort made by the Appel-
lant to get the deposition signed between DecembN, 195S, 
and November, 1960, (T. GO - G2). No effort was rnaJe 
to contact Darrell vVood through the Carpenter's l'nion 
or through his wife or children in Cadillac, ..\Iichigan (T. 
65), and no personal contact effort was made to con tad 
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Darrell Wood at his last known address in Roy, Utah, 
( T. 53 and 65), nor to find him through his brothers and 
sisters who reside in Utah, nor through his friend Law-
rence l\Ierrick (T. 5G, 57, 65, and 66). That illustrative 
of the Appellant's efforts to find Darrell Wood is con-
tained in the statement of his father (T. 55, L. 14-20). 
That the only time he talked with representatives of the 
Appellant was when he went to see them himself. That 
none of the letters written by Appellant to Darrell Wood 
stated or directed him to keep Appellant notified as to 
his whereabouts nor stressed the importance of his keep-
ing in touch with them. (T. 84 and 85). That the first 
letter written Darrell ·wood after deposition was mailed 
to father on DecembPr 28, 1958, was dated l\larch 20, 
1961, (Exhibit #5). 
At the pre-trial on August 1, 1961, counsel for Ap-
pellant informed the Court that the defendant's insurance 
eompany might invoke the non-cooperation provisions 
of the policy and that he might withdraw as counsel for 
~aid defense; and the ·Court gave counsel until August 
25, 19Gl, in which to advise defendant of the withdrawal; 
counsel for Appellant also offered the sum of $1,000.00 
in full settlement of all the causes of action (Exhibit 
11). At the trial on September 12, 1961, before pro-
ceeding with evidence, eounsel for Appellant after stat-
ing his position made an offer to pay the sum of $1.000.00 
in fnll settlement of all causes of action then pending; 
and in r!'sponse to questioning from the Court, stated 
that he won Id proeeed with tlw defense of Darrell Wood 
nndPr the eirenrnstanees as stated (Exhibit 1~). 
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At the trial of Case No. G93G, Cecil Tucker served 
as the Court Reporter, but Appellant made> no effort tr1 
have him, prior to or at the trial, certify thl1 unsigm·d 
deposition of Darrell vVood and made no effort to intro-
duce such deposition, ( T. 83), as provided !Jy Rule 311 
(t>), U.R.C.P. 
The judgment obtained in ·Case No. G93G ag-aiirnt 
Darrell vVood remained unsatisfied and th<> ahow-rn-
titled action was brought against the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE SUPPOR'l1 ED 'L'HE DI8TRlC1' 
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE INSURED 
COOPERATED \VlrrH rrIIl~ APPELL"'\.X1'. 
After the accident (June 2G, 1%7), the driVl'l' Darn·ll 
\Vood appeared on October 15, 1937, and gan• a stall·-
rnent before Cecil Tucker, the Court Reporter (Exhibit 
13) ; later delivered to the appellants the Summons and 
Complaint served upon him, and appeared on N ovl'mlwr 
13, 1958, at the office of Glenn \V. Adams to haVl' l1is 
deposition taken. The deposition was mailed to \Yilhud 
\Vood, father of Darrell \Vood, with a request that Dar-
rell's signature be obtained on it. '11 here is no <'VillPn.::~ 
that Darrell Wood ever receiv<>d the deposition. 'l'lwn· 
is no c1vidence that Darrell \Vood ever received any no-
tice of the trial elate. 
In Panczko vs. EaglP Indemnity Company of New 
York, 104 NE 2d, G45, tlw insun-'d apIJ<-•ared and gm-e a 
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pre-trial deposition and was advised he would be notified 
1r!wn th0 case was called for trial. Letters were written 
(ti the driver telling him about the trial day, which letters 
wPrr' rec:eipted by his wife; but he had separated from 
ltis wife and there was no evidence that he received 
noticr or knew of the trial day. A jury conclusion, on 
interrogatories that he did not fail to cooperate, was 
affirmed. 
ln two cases, involving similar fact situations, it 
1'.as <letenuined that there was no lack of cooperation 
nil the part of the insmed l'ven though the insured did 
nnt appear at the trial wlwn requested by the insurer. 
Wormington vs. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 56 
l'.~<l, l'.25-t (Wyoming) and ,Jpnsm vs. Eureka Casualty 
Company, G~ P.'.2d 5.f-0 (California). 
'rhP cas<~ of Cameron vs. Berger, 7 A2d 293, cited by 
A)l]Jdlant (Br. 8), appears to be concerned with a totally 
different fact situation. An examination of that case 
discloses that the insured, to avoid arrest, disappeared 
from hPr home several months prior to suit being filed 
agairn;t her for damages, and she gave the insurer no 
aid whatsoe\·er in the preparation or trial of the suits 
against her; and the insurer had no notice of the suits 
until eoun:wl for plaintiff notifo•d them on October 11, 
that tlw trial of the actions was listed for November 15. 
Tn the <·asp at hand, Darrell Wood did cooperate 
with the insmer, tlw Appellant, by giving them a sworn 
~tatement concerning the accident prior to any action 
hPing filed ag·ainst him, <lPlivt>red suit papers to the 
,.., 
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insurer after they were served on him, and at their re-
quest also appeared for a deposition long after the adion 
had been filed. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE CONCLU-
SION THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO 
SHUW IT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJU-
DICED BY THE NON-APPEARANCE OF 
DARRELL WOOD. 
29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1479, P. 588 states" ... it appears 
to be the view of the great majority of the courts that 
the lack of cooperation by the insured in failing to attend 
the trial or testify must be substantial or material, an<l 
that a technical or inconsequential lack of cooperation i:.; 
insufficient to void the policy .. accordingly, it has fre-
quently been held that the clause is not breeched by the 
insured's non-attendance where his testimony would nut 
have been of material aid or ·where, for this or other 
reason, the insurer was not prejudiced by his absence, 
or where the same or equivalent testimony could have 
been or was presented in some other manner or from 
some other source." 
It may have been much more advantageous for the 
Appellant to have utilized the deposition of Darrell Wood 
to bring before the Court his version of the facts con-
cerning the accident without further cross-examination 
than to personally have him present at the trial to again 
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testify to such facts and then be vigorously cross-exam-
ined concerning his testimony. 
The memorandum decision of the trial court sug-
gests that the appearance of Darrell Wood, in view of 
his background, may not have been helpful to the appel-
lants. This was the observation of the court in the State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange, 387 P.2d 82!1. 
POINT III 
THE E\TIDEKCE Sl~PPORTED THE DIS-
TRICT COFR'l"S CONCLrSION THAT THE 
INSURER DID ~OT USE DILIGENCE TO 
SECURE THE COOPERATION OF THE IN-
SURED. 
The courts have generally recognized that the in-
surer must establish due diligence to secure the insured'::; 
cooperation, particularly where the insurer has reason 
to anticipate that its insured might not respond ( 60 
A.L.H. ~d 1Hi3 - 11'71). A case which is illustrative of 
this principal is as follows: State Farm Mutual Auto-
n1obile Insurance Company vs. Farmers Insurance Ex-
d1ange, 387 P.2d, 825 (Oregon), wherein the Court 
pointed out at page 828 that it is to the interest of the 
defendant's insurance company not to have the insured 
coperate as this gives them an opportunity to escape a 
judgment which has been entered against the insured; 
and that therefore their efforts to locate the insured 
should bl' critically examined. The court further stated 
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that the opportunity inherent in this situation is a factor 
to be considered in determining the scope of their duty 
to use due diligence. Also see Johnson vs. Doughty, 38:J 
P.2d, 760 (Oregon). 
Applying the reasoning set forth in these cases, it 
seems clear that Appellant did not use due diligence in 
attempting to secure the attendance of Darrell Wood at 
the trial where they had prior indications that he might 
not be readily available at trial. The completed depo:;i-
tion was mailed to Darrell 'Vood's father December, 
1958, with a request to obtain Darrell's signature on it. 
There was no follow-up effort between December, 1958, 
and November, 1960, and the first letter tracing the depo-
sition was not mailed until .March 20, 19Gl. Darrell 
·wood apparently disappeared about June, 1959 ( T. G3 
L. 23); he was available for two years after the accident 
and for six months after the deposition was mailed. It 
is noted that the Appellant obtained the statement of 
passenger Lawrence .hforrick (Exhibit 14) on July 2G, 
1957, one month after the accident but failed to haye one 
of their claims representatives personally take the depo-
sition to Darrell Wood or do any other thing to get hi:: 
signature during the si..-x months that he was apparrn0.1· 
available after December, 1958. In view of the informa-
tion obtained by the Appellant in the statement givrn 
by him October 15, 1957, that he was separated from his 
wife, had been in Michigan three months the year before 
and was unemployed, put Appellant on notice that Dar-
rell Wood might be difficult to find at trial time and that 
an early signing of the deposition was imperative 
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POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY LACK 
OF COOPEHATIOX OX THE PART OF THE 
IXf'l~RED BY COXTIXCING ITS DEFENSE. 
At tltt· trial on SPptPmlJer 12, 1961, counsel for Ap-
Jiellant although advising the Court that he appeared 
in ddensP of the> rnatt0r on hehalf of the insurance com-
pany only, and aft<•r offrring to :-:ettle all th(• rau~es of 
action for tht· sum of $1,000.00, in responsP to tlw Court 
.<tating that thr> only defPndant was Darrell 'Vood, coun-
qJ for Ap1wllant stated that hP would procf'ed with the 
uef'ense of Darrell 'Vood under the circumstances stated. 
"\t tlir prr-trial on Angust 1, 1961, Appellant's counsel 
had been i1rntructed by the Court to notify Darrell 1rVood 
by A ugnst 25, 1961 if he did in fact intend to withdraw; 
counsel for appellant also offered to settle all causes of 
nl'tion for $1,000.00; no withdrawal was ewr made pur-
~nant to tlw lH"P-trial order. 
iOALH '.2<1 1 '.203 statPs, ''It ap1wars to be the rule 
that an antornobil0 liability insnrt-r whieh learns before 
tl1r trial of an aetion against its in:-:un•d that the insurf'd 
has hn·aelw<l the co-01wration elanse of the policy, and 
nt•\'Prthel!•ss def Pnds him at tlw trial, thereby waives or 
is (•stopped to assert the imrnn•d's nonrooperation, in a 
~nbseqnPnt action to rProver on the policy." 
70ALR 2d 1205 statPs, "In a number of cases 111 
whi<:h thl' im:nred nndPr an automobile liability insur-
ant·P policy faill'<l to appear at thl' trial of tlw original 
aetion brought against him, and tl1t' insurPr conduct<'d 
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the insured's defense in his absence, it was held that 
the insurer thereby waived or was estopped to assert 
this lack of cooperation by the insured, in a subsequPnt 
action on the policy." 
60ALR 2nd 1156 states, "Most of the courts con-
sidering the question have held or stated that an insurer, 
by continuing the defense with knowledge of the conduct 
of the insured, may waive the breach of the condition of 
the policy requiring his attendance or testimony at the 
trial, or may be estopped to take advantage of the hread1 
when sued by the injured party on the policy." 
Brandon vs. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 29.J: 
P. 881 (Kansas), appears to be a representative case 
under these ALR citations. In this case, an action was 
brought by B. against "'\V. for personal injuries, the at-
torney for W. was also the attorney for the insurance 
company of "'\V. in resistence of the claim. Bdore tlie 
trial of the case resulted, ,V. became insolvent and dis-
appeared. Thereafter he took no part in the trial and 
his whereabouts were unknown to any of the parties. 
His attorney who acted for the insurer procured a num-
ber of continuances of the case and when it was finally 
tried, a judgment in favor of B. was rendered. Several 
offers of setlement were made to B. by the attorney for 
"'\V. and the insurer in settlement of the claim and judg 
ment. The court held that by the attorney for W. and 
the insurer proceeding in the defense after W. has dis-
appeared, and also applying for and obtaining a num-
ber of continuances of the case, and also having made a 
number of offers of compromise and settlement with the 
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plaintiff, operated as a waiver of the failure of W. to 
aid in the defense. 
POINT V 
APPELLAXT MCST SHOW THAT IT 
ACTED "WITH REASOXABLE DILIGENCE 
AKD TOOK REASOXABLE STEPS TO OB-
\'1A11E THE PRE.Jl'DICIAL EFFECT OF 
~ON-A11TEN"DAN"CE OF IN"Sl'RED. 
Rule 30(e), U.R.C.P. provided for the use of an 
unsig11ed deposition. The trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision expressed the view that if the testimony of 
Darrell Wood as given in his deposition were believed, 
it would be a complete defense to the guest claims of 
plaintiffs. 
The Appellant took a statement (Exhibit 14) from 
Lawrence Merrick, one of passengers in the car, and 
k]J(•\1' his addrr•ss and the name and phone number of 
l1is sister (.:\I<>rrick's statenwnt page 24). This statement 
1rns giwn .J nly :2G, 1957, at Spring Glen, Utah, covering 
the evc•nts of June 2G, 1957. While Merrick stated that 
h1' \1 as asleep right at the time the car left the road 
(pages 14 · 1 j), he did not state that the car travelled 
about -iO miles per hour corning back (page 13-14). There 
is no evidence of any effort to secure the attendance of 
Lawrence Merrick at the trial for what assistance he 
ruight have been to the defense. 
:\.ppellant'~ failure to offer the unsigned deposition 
uf Danpll Wood as provided by tlw Rule, or to make an 
effort to procure the attendance of witness Lawrence 
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Merrick, was a lack of reasonable diligence to obviate the 
prejudicial effect of the insureds non-attendance (see 
29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1479). 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and decree of Trial Court were found-
ed on fact and law presented at the trial and should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAXD. LAMPH 
305-308 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
GLENN W. ADAMS 
512 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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